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Over the past year we have been attempting to build a model
of the way humans process information about their relations with
each other. As political scientists we are applying this model
in an area of our special interest, international political systems.
The model is dynamically represented within a digital computer,
and has been constructed to utilize the advantages of computer
time sharing.
This afternoon I would like to describe to you selected parts of
the model and our first test.
The purpose of Crisiscom is to simulate national decision makess
as they confront each other in a crisis. Crisiscom refers to com-
munication in a crisis. The simulation is a dynamic model in which
each decision maker :
1. Receives information about his environment.
2. Incorporates this information in ways which are a
function of his own cognitive structure and of socio-
psychological processes.
and
3. Generates new information.
In real world international communication systems, the information
about which we are speaking is international news such as found in the
New York Times. Examining the content of this news we would see that
it is primarily information about international actors and the rela-
tionships among them. Our simulation, when completed, will represent
the information processing capabilities of decision makers who ini-
tially receive a scenario of news, who digest this news, and who
generate more news which in turn others incorporate, digest and gen-
erate, and so forth.
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Within the Crisiscom syistem are subsystems which simulate a
particular decision maker, or actor. These subsystems actually repre-
sent only the "cognitive system" of an actor. By the concept "cog-
nitive system" we mean a person' s structured picture of the actors and
relationships he perceives in his environment, and the processes of
incorporation and manipulation of the information from this environment.
The environmental information is described by a scenario. This
scenario is a corpus of English sentences or messages, each stating a
relationship between one actor and another, Each cognitive system
receives some subset of the scanario messages. that is, not all actors
receive all messages. Actors are thus said to be "selectively exposed"
to the information generated within the system as described by the
scenario.
Our concern is not with the psychological processes of human per-
ception, but with the socio-psychological perception processes which
operate on input messages. These processes of "selective perception*
differentially weight the messages as they are received and bias them
as they are integrated into the cognitive system. Thus the cognitive
structure of each actor is not a perfect symbolic replication of his
environment. Through selective exposure he does not receive all in-
formation from his environment and through selective perception he
biases the information he receives.
There are constraints on the volume of information an actor's
cognitive system can incorporate. He can "attend" to a limited amount
of information during a given time. The amount of information to which
an actor is exposed is assumed to be larger than the amount of in-
formation to which he can attend, This condition especially charac-
terizes a crisis period, during which time large amounts of information
are generated As part of his selective perception, an actor must
reduce his information input to a size he can manage in his "attention
space".
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Bach cognitive system can be thought of as a set of cognitive
elements and relationships among them. The elements and relations
are represented in our simulation by simplified syn tactic and semantic
structures, and by socio-psychological relations.
The perception processes examine each new message to test its
credibility. The syntactic and semantic relations of the message are
compared with the actor's cognitive structure to determine whether the
message makes sense.
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is neither sensible to us nor to our simulated actor.
The socio-psychological relations we utilize are salience and affect,
Salience is a measure of the evaluation of importance of an ele-
ment to an actor.
Affect is the positive or negative evaluation of an attitude of an
actor toward an element.
Let us look at today's news, for example.
New York Times
Bach cognitive system has a section denoted as the *attention space".
In this space are kept the message elements and relations to which the
actor is attending. The selection of messages for the attention space
is a function of the message salience. In general, the most salient
messages get into the attention space; however. information in the
attention space has an additional inertia-like quality. Information
already in the attention space tends to remain there if new input in-
formation in only slightly more salient than that in attention. The
salience of new information must be larger than the present attention
space information in order to replace this information. If a new
message is associated with information already in attention, this new
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message is added to attention, taking preference over information of
higher salience. Input messages are associated semantically into.
classes. Messages having similar content are classified into a set
called an event. For example, several messages concerning tariffs,
coming from, and about Common Market decision makers might be
classified as the event, Common Market Tariff Problems.
George Miller has hypothesized seven plus or minus two as the
number of things to which a person can attend. We hypothesize that an
actor attends to from five salient things to nine unimportant things;
however, under conditions of extremely high salience as in a crisis,
an actor may attend to as few as one thing. We consider the "thingb"
in attention space to be events. Furthermore, if an event set contains
many messages, the seven plus or minus two most salient messages
have precedence if the event is in attention space.
It is interesting to note that in the "Major Events of the Day"
in the New York Times there are invariably 7!2 paragraphs describing
the most salient events of the day, each having 712 important points
in them.
Several socic-psychological hypotheses relate the pe rception
processes with the attention space structure* These hypotheses
provide mechanisms for biasing the salienpe and affect evaluations.
Since the criteria for entrance to attention space is a function of the
salience of the messages, these biases influence the possibility of a
message entering the attention space.
1. People pay more attention to information that deals with them.
2. People pay less attention to facts that contradict their views.
3. People pay more attention to information from trusted, liked
sources.
5. People pay more attention to information that they will have to
act on or discuss because of attention bX others.
5o People pay more attention to information bearing on actions they
ave alread t enl Fra ed mtmelk
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our basic hypothesis about attention space is:
A person's cognitive structure is updated and altered
by the information he attends to. Thus of all the
information an actor receives only the contents of his
attention space alter his cognitive structure.
In our first simulation our primary interest is in the five
perception hypotheses and attention space mechanisms. A very limited
cognitive structure of an actor is provided, consisting of affect and
salience relations amon twenty-four actors. The cognitive systems
of only two of the actors, Decision Makers One and Two are simulated.
The scenario is written by a person who supplies the salience and
affect values.
Some messages, called "secret" only go to one of the two actors.
Messages that get into attention space alter the affect relations in
the limited cognitive structure.
The simulation is initialized by providing each decision maker with
his perception of the affect and salience relations among the other
actors. The simulation input is the scenario messages. The output
presently is the contents of attention space, the remainder of the
semantio-syntactic cognitive structure, and the new values of the
affect relations.
Our first simulation is being tested on the crisis week before
World War I. The scenario has about two hundred messages for each of
the seven days of the week b The seenario was prepared from histo.rical
studies, newspapers of the day, and official documents of the period.
The content of the scenario covers the broad spectrum of events of the
period from jewel robberies to war mobilisation. The Kaiser and the
Czar are the two national decision-makers whose cognitive systems are
simulated. At the end of each simulated day, the attention space and
matrix of affect relations of the Kaiser and the Czar is provided for
the experimenter. By adjusting parameters of the perception processes,
a distribution of attention spaces and affect matrices can be
generated through running the simulation several times.
Scenarios of the Kennedy-Khrushchev Cuban Missle Crisis and of
political science games having human participants are also in prepara-
tion for testing the simulation. By allowing intimate man-machine
interaction through time-sharing, humans can interact as actors in
the system. Numerous gaming possibilities as well as opportunities for
decision makers to test decisions for their effect on the real environ-
ment are made available through this model.
